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*J.B.L. 666 Introduction
The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (the EC Regulation)1 has introduced new concepts
and measures for dealing with the conundrum of a multi-jurisdictional insolvency which were
consequently followed in other models,2 placing the EU as a world leader in the regulation of
cross-border insolvency. Yet the Regulation left a considerable gap where it refrained from providing
frameworks for dealing with multinational groups in insolvency.3 Other models for cross-border
insolvency followed suit and left this issue unresolved as well.4 There has also been no attempt thus
far on the European level to harmonise core insolvency laws,5 and thus although there are pressures
on legal systems to converge in this area,6 laws of insolvency still differ among Member States,
including the treatment of groups in insolvency.
On the global level, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), via its
working group which deals with insolvency matters (the Working Group) has recently attempted to
address the problem of groups (in insolvency) both in terms of the core insolvency remedies
(pertaining to groups) *J.B.L. 667 and the private international law aspects (the cross-border
insolvency of a multinational group). The recommendations on this matter will be included in a new
part of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. 7 Thus new international standards in the
area of insolvency of groups are now available. With the revision of the EC Regulation soon
approaching8 there is, therefore, an opportunity to learn from the experience and suggestions of
UNCITRAL and push the area of European insolvency forward. Moreover, the special position of the
European regulator, which refers to a limited number of rather closely related states, enables it to
potentially improve on the UNCTIRAL recommendations (which still leave gaps), leading the way
once again in those areas.
This article discusses the proposals of UNCITRAL and their suitability in the European context. In
that, the article takes a global perspective. That is, the desirable approach for Europe is investigated
through the assessment of recommendations set out by another international lawmaker. Critically,
though, the differences in the infrastructures and available frameworks at each level (the regional and
global) are taken into account--considering any limitations or otherwise opportunities for more
comprehensive solutions on the European level. The goals of European insolvency law and the
accumulated practical experience of using the EC Regulation are also taken into account.
The article discusses these issues in four sections. The first gives background on the current
regulatory framework for European insolvencies and the treatment of groups, while the other three
sections consider the suitability of the UNCITRAL proposals (or other solutions) for groups in the EU
context: the second section focuses on core insolvency solutions for groups and the desirability of
harmonisation in this area in Europe; the third and fourth sections address the private international
law aspects, i.e. the cross-border insolvency measures for groups. While the third section considers
measures for co-operation and co-ordination between affiliate companies (suggested by UNCITRAL),
the fourth considers the possibility of achieving more ambitious solutions in the European context.
European insolvency law and the treatment of groups--background
The entry into force of the EC Regulation9 (in 2002)10 has marked a dramatic change in the regulation
of cross-border insolvency proceedings with European elements (i.e. creditors, assets, branches,
subsidiaries and so forth located in more than one *J.B.L. 668 Member State). Previously each
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Member State could have determined for itself whether it had jurisdiction over debtors' insolvencies
(even when the debtor might have had a tenuous connection to the jurisdiction and a considerable
presence in another Member State), which laws should apply to the proceedings and whether or not
to recognise insolvency proceedings opened in other Member States. This situation could have easily
resulted in legal chaos which was what the EC Regulation attempted to resolve. Being binding and
directly applicable in all Member States (except Denmark),11 since its adoption the Regulation
determines the proper forum for handling insolvency proceedings in Europe12 --which is the place
where the debtor has its centre of main interests (COMI),13 and consequently the laws that will apply
to insolvency matters (the laws of the forum).14 It also provides that only one such principal
proceedings may be opened and that it will have a universal effect and apply to all (European)
aspects of the debtor's insolvency wherever located. The proceedings should then be automatically
recognised in all Member States without further formalities.15 This enables the office holder to take
speedy measures in other Member States to assert the rights to control and administer the entire
estate.16
In addition to the main proceedings opened at the COMI forum the Regulation allows for opening of
any number of “territorial” proceedings (“secondary” to the main proceedings or “independent
territorial”) in other Member States.17 The effects of the territorial proceedings should be limited,
though, to the local assets (situated in the jurisdiction opening the proceedings),18 and in the case of
“secondary” proceedings they may only be winding-up proceedings.19 Furthermore, the liquidators in
the main and secondary proceedings are duty bound to co-operate with each other,20 and the
liquidator in the secondary proceedings has to allow the main liquidator to submit proposals on the
liquidation or use of the assets in the secondary proceedings.21 The court of the secondary
proceedings shall also stay these proceedings at the request of the main liquidator subject to possible
guarantees by the main liquidator and assuming it is in the interest of the creditors in the main
proceedings.22
*J.B.L. 669 The EC Regulation refrained, though, from dealing with two major issues--the
harmonisation of domestic insolvency laws and the regulation of cross-border insolvency of groups.
Generally, it was appreciated that domestic laws on matters concerning credit, security and
insolvency widely differ. Against such background, a full harmonisation project might have been too
farfetched at that point in time. The Regulation confined itself to a framework which could be workable
and politically acceptable.23 Thus, the Regulation only harmonises the private international law
aspects of insolvency--as aforementioned it determines the forum and laws to which the proceedings
will be subjected, but thereafter the insolvency solutions that may apply (both matters of procedure
and substantive law) depends on the law applicable which may differ from Member State to Member
State. With respect to the treatment of groups it means that their insolvencies may eventually be
handled in some joint manner (if proceedings against group members are consolidated) or on a
separate basis, depending on the particular legal system in which the case may end up--the
Regulation itself does not provide mechanisms such as substantive consolidation whereby separate
corporate entities may be regarded as one in the course of their insolvency.24 The private international
law aspects, on the other hand, are dealt with quite comprehensively within the Regulation, as
delineated above, yet without providing explicit (private international law) rules for international groups
in insolvency.25 Again, this might have made sense at the time--dealing with the complex case of
enterprise groups at the same time of devising a whole new framework for cross-border insolvency
could have impeded the success of the whole endeavour.26 Anyhow, the result is that the Regulation
does not address, for example, the possibility of centralising insolvency proceedings against group
members in a single jurisdiction and does not provide a mechanism for locating a group centre for this
purpose. Jurisdiction in this context is supposed to be determined for each group member separately.
27 There are also no provisions regarding means of co-operation between courts or representatives
presiding over affiliate companies' insolvency proceedings.28
The question is whether the time has come for further development of European insolvency law in
these directions, namely advancing mechanisms specific for groups which may give effect to the links
between the group entities inter-se (allowing a degree of consolidation of the proceedings) as well as
the links between them across borders (enhancing global group-wide solutions). The following
sections examine this question while considering the new proposals of UNCITRAL with regard to the
treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency.
*J.B.L. 670 Taking UNCITRAL's advice on consolidation of group proceedings
The concept of the corporate form29 dictates that each entity in an enterprise group is treated
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separately--in the ordinary course of business as well as when a group collapses. However, there is
merit in applying “group solutions” in the course of insolvency which could allow unified group-wide
sales or reorganisation plans. Especially where the group was integrated (i.e. it operated a single
business or otherwise there were significant administrative or financial links between the entities),
unified solutions may be more efficient and produce greater returns to creditors.30 In some instances,
in particular where the assets and debts of the different entities were intermingled, it might even be
impossible or highly costly to separate the different businesses in the course of insolvency.31 Each of
the circumstances just delineated may require different solutions but certainly a completely separate
process with no link among the entities in the course of insolvency may result in losses to creditors in
both scenarios.
The new addition to the Insolvency Guide32 aims to tackle this problem. It includes recommendations
regarding the regulation of group insolvencies, and proposes that legal regimes adopt the doctrines of
procedural co-ordination and substantive consolidation and allow co-ordinated reorganisation plans to
be proposed.33 Within the Guide those measures pertain to domestic groups (the private international
law aspects pertaining to multinational groups are dealt with separately). However, such measures
will also serve multinational groups which may end up being handled in a jurisdiction which has
adopted any of the proposed measures.
In essence, procedural co-ordination will allow the handling of two or more proceedings against
members of the same group in some joint manner. The Insolvency Guide suggests flexibility here, so
that co-ordination can be implemented in different ways--the entire process may be handled under the
supervision of a single court (where this is permitted by domestic law) or via co-ordination among
several proceedings opened in different courts; it may involve different co-ordination techniques
regarding different aspects of the process, such as co-ordinated hearings, co-ordination of avoidance
proceedings and so forth.34 A single representative may be appointed to all group members.35
Alternatively, if more than one representative is appointed the representatives should co-operate to
the maximum extent possible.36 Such co-operation may deal with the sharing of information, the
division of powers and responsibilities in regard to the enterprise (with the possibility of any of the
representatives taking a leading role), the co-ordination of reorganisation plans' proposals, and
co-ordination of administration *J.B.L. 671 of debtors' affairs including matters of funding,
preservation and selling of assets.37 A co-ordinated reorganisation plan for an enterprise group may
be proposed either within a procedural co-ordination process or absent a formal order of
co-ordination.38 The Guide envisages group-wide reorganisation plans comprising several group
members under insolvency, yet an enterprise group entity which is not subject to insolvency
proceedings may participate in such a plan as well. This will be based on an ordinary business
decision taken by that member, subject to applicable company law.39
Substantive consolidation--i.e. the pooling of assets and debts (of the various entities) together--is
kept for the rare circumstances where the court is satisfied that the assets or liabilities of the
enterprise group members are intermingled to such an extent that the ownership of assets and
responsibility for liabilities cannot be identified without disproportionate expense or delay40 ; or where
the court is satisfied that enterprise group members were engaged in a fraudulent scheme or activity
with no legitimate business purpose.41
It seems that UNCITRAL generally got it right.42 It suggests different measures for different types of
scenarios. In the more common scenario procedural co-ordination of some sort will suffice in order to
promote efficiency of the process. In those circumstances the assets, debts and creditors of each
member remain intact and thus there is no real intervention with the notions of separate corporate
personality and limited liability. Only in exceptional cases the “veil of incorporation” may be lifted in
the sense that assets and debts will be mixed. Intermingling of assets is indeed a scenario where the
partitioning of assets (usually regarded as the key economic benefit of separate personality in the
group context43 ) was just a façade,44 and fraud is always a reason to look behind the “corporate veil”.
45 Thus, the exceptions are certainly limited and are within the legitimate boundaries of the corporate
form concept.46
Within Europe such solutions are only entertained by some Member States. Additionally, even where
measures are available, the circumstances when they may be applied often differ or are not readily
apparent (especially to foreign “users”). For example, procedural consolidation is provided for in the
Spanish Insolvency Act47 (but not substantive consolidation), whereas in the United *J.B.L. 672
Kingdom there is no equivalent provision, though de facto procedural consolidations are often being
achieved as a matter of practice where the same insolvency practitioners from the same major firm of
accountants may be appointed as liquidators or administrators to the various entities comprising the
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corporate group.48 Irish law allows, in legislation, ordering the pooling of the assets and debts of
related companies together whenever this is “just and equitable” (while taking into account a range of
factors),49 whereas in other jurisdictions (such as the United Kingdom and Spain) pooling or
substantive consolidation is not available at all in the legislation (though courts may allow it in rare
cases of confusion of assets).50 French law does not provide rules on procedural co-ordination, but
provides that proceedings against a group member may be extended to one or more other persons
where their assets are intermingled with those of the debtor or where their legal entity is a sham.51
There is, thus, significant divergence in the approach to groups in insolvency. Notably, to a
considerable extent, Member States' legal systems do not comply with the international standards
agreed upon at UNCITRAL level, either because they lack measures for groups, or because the
measures they suggest are too broad--allowing the mixing of assets and debts whenever this is “just
and equitable” (which may result with excessive intervention with the corporate form).
There is, therefore, scope for further harmonisation in this area--ensuring that mechanisms such as
procedural and substantive consolidation are available in Member States' legal systems, and that the
particulars of these remedies are within the internationally acceptable limits of the corporate form (in
the insolvency context). This will be particularly conducive to cross-border insolvencies. Whichever
type of international framework is applied to such cases (be it co-ordination between the group
members' proceedings or centralisation of the process in some way),52 the success of such
insolvencies will depend on the availability of group solutions in the legal system and on sufficient
similarities among those “domestic” measures. Otherwise, any international co-ordination might be
difficult to achieve (in the absence of coherence between the solutions available in the relevant
systems). Centralisation of the process in a single jurisdiction might also be useless if the case ends
up being handled in a jurisdiction where there are no available group solutions. Centralisation would
also most likely be perceived as threatening to state sovereignty, and thus difficult to agree upon
(voluntarily or ex ante in international legislation53 ), in the absence of a harmonised approach to the
treatment of groups. Finally, forum shopping will be diminished if a level playing field is provided for
throughout the EU regarding the treatment of groups.54
Such harmonisation may be achieved on a Member State by Member State basis which may be
engaged in reforms or renovation of their domestic insolvency laws, and in this process may, as
envisaged by UNCITRAL, have regard to the *J.B.L. 673 recommendations provided in the Guide. A
better approach, though, which could accelerate the harmonisation process, would be that European
bodies (rather than each Member State separately) will be guided by the Guide while devising or
renovating European insolvency laws embracing the above group solutions on a European level, by
way of directives or regulation.55 This could enhance compliance, or allow that provisions be directly
applicable in the laws of the Member States.
In fact, providing solutions for group insolvencies (“from the top”--enhancing harmonisation in this
area) is something that has been viewed favourably in the past on the European level. Thus, in the
2002 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts, it was recommended that rules on
groups' bankruptcies, in particular procedural and substantive consolidation, should be devised.56 This
recommendation has not been taken on board, though, thus far, probably since it was seen as a
matter of bankruptcy law and thus outside the remit of the company law harmonising programme.
In light of the urgency for solutions for enterprises in distress, especially groups which are a prevalent
phenomenon and whose collapse result in tremendous shockwaves, it is time to revive this positive
attitude towards harmonisation in insolvency, particularly dealing with the group problem. A support
for this approach can now be found in the INSOL Report and the EU Draft Report which propose
developing rules for groups on the European level. The reports recommend that intermingled groups
will be substantively consolidated (and in that they follow UNCITRAL's suggestions). Procedural
consolidation (and other aspects of groups in insolvency) is not discussed as the recommendations
seem to focus on international groups and on jurisdictional issues (on which see further below).57
Expanding the concept of co-operation in cross-border insolvency and applying it to
groups (as advised by UNCITRAL)
The question is how such group solutions as mentioned above can be achieved on a pan-European
level in those cases where the group members were not all located in the same country. As with
single debtor cross-border insolvencies, private international law complexities come into play, only
now these also interact with the notion of the corporate form, since the different entities are not only
controlled by different jurisdictions, they are also legally separated from their affiliates. A relatively
simple way to overcome this challenge is not to make too much change in how things are: leave each
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entity to the control of its local state, yet co-operate between the different states' courts and
representatives (or even appoint the same insolvency representative to the different group members)
to smooth the group proceedings and perhaps achieve group-wide solutions. This will still be a
considerable improvement on the more “territorialist” (and entity-based) alternative where each entity
will handle its insolvency on a completely separate basis with no link created between the entities
situated in the different territories, a solution which may well be desirable for non-integrated groups
but may be disadvantageous to those groups which were somewhat unified in the ordinary course of
business and would benefit from a degree of co-operation and co-ordination in the course *J.B.L.
674 of insolvency. At the same time, such co-operation between affiliates' proceedings will not be
“interventionist”--neither to state control nor to the corporate form--as each set of proceedings
remains local and the assets and debts are not being mixed.
This is what UNCITRAL suggests for international groups, in the new part of the Guide.58 The Guide
builds on the provisions on co-operation, co-ordination and communication provided in the Model
Law,59 and expand them to groups, suggesting that insolvency laws will allow courts and insolvency
representatives presiding over the proceedings of different members of the same group to co-operate,
including by way of agreeing on protocols (cross-border insolvency agreements), and communicate
(including directly between the courts).60 The Guide goes beyond that and propose some additional
forms of co-operation and communication among group members' proceedings, including the
appointment of the same insolvency representative to administer insolvency proceedings concerning
members of the same enterprise group in different states,61 which can assist in achieving global
group-wide solutions. It also refers to a new document recently concluded by UNCITRAL62 in which
accumulated experience of using protocols, including between affiliate entities, is provided in detail
which could further enhance the use of such agreements.
A similar exercise can be applied at EU level--expanding on existing notions of co-operation and
utilising them in groups. The EC Regulation is somewhat limited, though, in terms of the co-operation
measures. Currently, there is a rather general requirement in the Regulation that the liquidators in the
main and secondary proceedings co-operate and communicate,63 with no further delineation of
possible methods of co-operation and communication. There is, therefore, room for improvement here
in regard to single companies too.64 In any case, co-operation techniques should be available for all
situations where there is more than one set of related proceedings which have been or may be
opened, be it secondary proceedings in regard to the same debtor or main proceedings regarding a
separate entity part of a group. Even if more comprehensive measures may be available for both
scenarios (i.e. the opening of all proceedings against a debtor of a group in the same jurisdiction65 ),
there may be situations where such a solution would not be adequate, especially where the presence
of the company or of the group in the foreign jurisdiction is substantial.66 Moreover, although such
measures (for example, direct communication between courts) are already being applied in practice,
even in the absence of concrete rules,67 the inclusion of such mechanisms explicitly in *J.B.L. 675
the legislation68 could facilitate and encourage their use, especially where jurisdictions which are less
familiar with such measures are involved. Indeed, in the case of a multinational group, the mere use
of co-operation mechanisms (linking entities across borders) may not be trivial.69 Currently, the EU
Draft Report recommends that where the operational structure of the group does not allow
identification of a group centre, the proceedings should at least be co-ordinated.70 For the reasons
mentioned above, this would be a considerable improvement on the current state of affairs.
Furthermore, as these draft recommendations closely follow UNCITRAL's standards they contribute
to global harmonisation and compliance with international standards beyond the confines of the EU.
Going beyond the UNCITRAL proposals to define the leader in a multinational group
insolvency process
Undoubtedly, a multiple-jurisdiction (and multiple-law) insolvency process may often require greater
effort and costs and will be more prone to interruptions compared with a single process handled in
one jurisdiction. UNCITRAL's new standards on the treatment of international groups in insolvency do
not, however, go beyond the concept of co-ordination and co-operation as delineated above.
However, more comprehensive measures were discussed throughout the deliberations of the
Working Group. In particular, the idea of identifying the centre of main interests (COMI) of an
enterprise group where the different proceedings may be centralised was discussed.71 An alternative,
where the COMI forum will be regarded as a co-ordination centre (allowing the opening of local
proceedings and subjecting them to the leadership of the centre forum) was also considered.72 None
of these concepts had culminated in concrete recommendations. The Working Group considered the
COMI to be a vague and not fully developed notion, and thus saw its extension into enterprise groups
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premature at the moment. In addition, UNCITRAL's cross-border insolvency measures (i.e. the Model
Law73 ) do not encompass rules for international jurisdiction and automatic recognition and thus
applying a group COMI concept may be more problematic.74 The fear was that COMI is still not a
universal concept and so it will be difficult to enforce it in relation to groups.75 Furthermore, in the
group context, COMI would be used for the purpose of global consolidation, but this is contingent
upon adoption of consolidation concepts in the legal systems.76 There was also some concern that
*J.B.L. 676 group COMI (and the concentration of the proceedings in a single jurisdiction) might
intervene with state control over local proceedings and harm local creditors.77 On the more practical
level, the Working Group was under time pressure to provide the world with measures for group
insolvency urgently owing to the financial crises. In this light, more controversial solutions had to wait
until a later stage. This was also the background to the decision to include the international measures
for groups in a Guide rather than a Model Law at this stage.78
However, the Working Group at no point decided that the idea of centralising group proceedings (at
the group centre forum) is flawed. On the contrary, several times in the deliberations it noted the
desirability of avoiding multiple proceedings in the corporate group context and that an enterprise
group COMI concept could facilitate cost reduction, co-ordination of global sales of assets, value
maximisation, minimisation of forum shopping and the promotion of global reorganisations of groups.
79 It did realise, however, that enterprise groups perhaps require more nuanced solutions and that the
notion of COMI itself (in its current form within the key cross-border insolvency models) needs to be
further improved. Indeed, the Working Group has determined that one of its main projects for future
work should be the development of the COMI concept.80 For the time being, though, it focused on
encouraging courts and representatives to co-operate. Of course, the possibility that such
co-operation will lead to centralised proceedings where a single court or at least a single
representative will lead the process (or otherwise parallel processes will be co-ordinated to the
maximum extent possible) is acknowledged and encouraged.81 However, the Working Group
refrained from recommending which forum or representative should take up the leading role or what
will be its actual role and powers.
Back in Europe, the question is whether it is desirable to take that further step in Europe and
implement a group COMI concept--clarifying ex ante what will be the principal forum in a group
process and what will be its role. It is submitted that this is indeed the right approach to take.
First, it will fit with a key goal of cross-border insolvency, enshrined in the Regulation, namely
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of cross-border insolvency proceedings.82 Developing the
notion of COMI in a way that will allow the identification of a mutual centre for group members could
ensure that in appropriate circumstances a parallel process is avoided and a degree of centralisation
is achieved. Specifically, avoiding parallel proceedings in the context of integrated groups would save
costs of multiple hearings, cross-border communication and flow of information where information and
activities taken in one part of the group are relevant to the other parts. Especially where a rescue
*J.B.L. 677 process in envisaged, centralisation would be a significant advantage, considering the
more complex decision-making involved and the need for urgent measures to be taken. Centralisation
would be even more crucial in the cases of intermingled groups requiring greater unity in the handling
of the process and the application of measures such as substantive consolidation.83 Although
centralisation may be achieved on an ad hoc basis, this may not always be the case, especially in
large and globally spread groups where different groups of creditors in different countries may pull to
different directions impeding global group-wide solutions. Pre-defined rules on the centralisation of
proceedings would also enhance predictability and thus ex ante efficiency.84
Secondly, such a pre-defined centralisation concept would not defeat state sovereignty, if the concept
is applied in a nuanced way. A group COMI notion could allow a number of “centralisation levels”, the
full one saved for the integrated centralised groups, namely those that were centrally controlled from
the group head office in the ordinary course of business. In these cases, the group operated de facto
as a single company with branches. It is therefore equivalent to the centralization of proceedings in
the (single) company's home state (COMI) with the possibility of opening secondary proceedings in
the host states (establishments). In other words, in terms of state control there is no real harm in
centralisation in those scenarios since the host states of the subsidiaries were not really in complete
control over the local entities in the ordinary course of business, as these where managed and
controlled via a common head office located in the centre forum of the group.85 It should also be noted
that the corporate form concept is not affected either, as the group is being unified for jurisdictional
purposes only, and otherwise the veil is not lifted.86
Of course, one should consider other scenarios and circumstances where full centralisation may not
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be adequate--for instance, decentralised groups (a scenario in which the subsidiaries are
autonomous and independently and locally managed). Indeed, a nuanced solution for groups is
required, and a “one size fits all” approach is inadequate. A group COMI could be useful for these
scenarios too, though. It could result in these cases with a lower level of centralisation solution (and a
different role designated to the group COMI), where the centre forum would be the co-ordinator (the
leader) of the group process rather than the only forum for opening proceedings.87 This solution can
be applied, for example, by way of allowing additional (secondary or main) proceedings to be opened
in the subsidiaries' jurisdictions while retaining the supervisory role of the centre forum. The latter
appointed representative may be the one appointed to all other proceedings and/or have additional
prerogatives such as the power to request the stay of the local process in the interest of the group, or
the opportunity to submit proposals on the liquidation or the use of assets of the subsidiary by the
liquidator *J.B.L. 678 in the principal proceedings (similar to the powers granted to the liquidator in
the main proceedings under the EC Regulation88 ). However, in such cases the principal
representative should not receive assets remaining in the subsidiaries' proceedings and use them in
the insolvency of other related companies,89 as (unless in the case of substantive consolidation) the
assets and debts of each entity should remain intact. On the other hand, the opening of main
proceedings in regard to any of the affiliates should allow taking the rescue path, though again this
should be subject to supervision and interventionist powers by the principal representatives to ensure
that a global reorganisation is achievable in the appropriate cases.
Thirdly, the Regulation provides the framework for achieving rather smooth centralisation of
insolvency proceedings. In contrast with the Model Law, it does provide rules on international
jurisdiction and automatic recognition, as well as choice of law rules.90 In other words, Member States
party to the Regulation have already agreed to surrender a considerable degree of control for the
purpose of achieving greater efficiency in the handling of cross-border insolvency. This regulatory
infrastructure can facilitate more coherent rules for groups too, where a group centre forum could be
identified, and could then be automatically recognised following the opening of the main proceedings
(being the lead proceedings or the only set of proceedings opened against the group members,
depending on the circumstances). Subsequently, the law of the forum could mainly apply to the
bankruptcy issues,91 with the remedies for group insolvencies qualifying as such matters.
Undoubtedly, as observed by the Working Group of UNCITRAL, not much can be achieved if no such
procedural and substantive remedies for groups are available in the legal system.92 This brings us
back to the discussion above that amplified the need to comply with the new international standards
on group solutions and their inclusion in European legal systems.
Fourthly, there are indications that a centralisation concept is not only desirable and fits with the
Regulation's framework--it is also feasible, particularly with the COMI test becoming quite consistent
and stable in its current application. Furthermore, it also seems to be the case that COMI is applied in
such a way that allows for group solutions to be achieved in practice--emphasising the real seat
nature of COMI rather than the statutory seat element (the latter being enshrined in the presumption
that COMI is at the registered office and would lead to the opening of multiple proceedings wherever
there is a registered office of a subsidiary), and aspects of management. This approach is apparent
from considering cases such as Daisytek, 93 Energotech, 94 Hettlage 95 and Nortel 96 where main
proceedings against all European group members were opened in one jurisdiction (the location of the
group head office), even though subsidiaries were registered in different states. An empirical study
which investigated a larger dataset of Member *J.B.L. 679 States' courts' decisions concerning
ascertaining COMI points to the same direction. It was evident from the case law analysed in the
study that Member States' courts (of different jurisdictions), when making a COMI determination
regarding companies which had connections to different jurisdictions,97 tend to rebut the presumption
that COMI is at the registered office of the company, and quite consistently emphasise elements of
central administration (the head office functions) as key connecting factors.98 As aforementioned, this
is conducive to centralisation of groups. By adopting a jurisdictional test which is based on economic
realities, in particular where it focuses on aspects of management, a group centre can be identified
(the central administration of the members of the integrated group) and group solutions can be
promoted.99
The Working Group of UNCITRAL, while considering what could potentially serve as a definition of an
enterprise group COMI,100 was also in favour of an economic realities-based test. The presumption
was still to be preserved but transferred to the parent company. Rebutting the presumption would
then follow if it was shown that the economic centre of the group is elsewhere.101
The case of Stanford, 102 though, may mark a shift in the approach. The English court (first instance)
Page7
simply rejected the “simple head office test”--which was embraced by the same court in previous
cases.103 Instead, the court seemed to have focused on the presumption regarding the location of the
registered office and third parties' perceptions as leading factors. Based on this approach, it
considered Antigua (and not the United States) to be the COMI of the Stanford company in issue
(SIB).104 It is arguable that the SIB company was managed in Antigua,105 and thus the group as a
whole or at least this part of the group could be regarded as a decentralised one and there might
have been sense, therefore, in conducting local Antiguan proceedings.106 It is difficult to draw
conclusions from fraud cases where the structure of the business may be artificial and a mask to hide
the fraudulent endeavours. Anyhow, in other cases the head office may be in a place other than the
place of incorporation, the group may be centralised and a unified process may be impeded if too
much weight is given to the presumption (which links the COMI to the registered office). It is
somewhat reassuring, though, that one of the judges *J.B.L. 680 in the Court of Appeal (in Stanford )
re-emphasised the head office test as a key one in COMI determination, and that even after Stanford
the COMI is still usually at the head office functions of the company.107
Indeed, if the trend of focusing on the economic reality and the head office functions test does
continue, or even more so if an explicit rule along these lines is devised which elevates central
administration and management factors over other factors in group cases, then it will be possible to
continue achieving centralisations of proceedings. Such seems to be the approach currently taken in
the EU Draft Report which recommends that main proceedings against members of centrally
controlled groups will be opened in the place of the operational headquarters of the group.108
Yet, less than full centralisation should be allowed too, avoiding the abandoning of group-wide
solutions in the cases where it is not straightforward that the direct head office of each subsidiary is
located in the same place. Thus, for example, a group process may encompass all the integrated and
centrally controlled entities and be handled at the group head office (the central administration of
those entities). At the same time, though, separate proceedings may be opened in another Member
State against a particular entity which was independently managed. This subsidiary's proceeding can
still be linked to the main group process--either by means of co-operation or, if appropriate, by
subordinating the process to an extent to the centre process, granting the group representative some
prerogatives and powers in regard the subsidiary's proceedings, as mentioned above. This may be
especially acute where the group has been dependent on this entity prior to insolvency. In this
context, it should also be possible to take into account “group considerations” (and what is the
purpose of the proceedings) when determining whether and to what extent to centralise or co-ordinate
the group process. For example, an intention to restructure the group as a whole (because it was
integrated and operated a single business) or to pool assets and debts together in the course of
insolvency (because the affairs of the members were intermingled) should support greater
centralisation of the process.
Having pre-defined centralisation rules would, to an extent, make co-operation techniques less
dominant. However, as mentioned above, even where a degree of centralisation is adequate and
achievable, additional proceedings may need to be opened (either main proceedings against an
independent subsidiary or secondary proceedings) in which case additional co-operation measures,
such as the use of protocols, may further enhance the co-ordination of the process. Furthermore,
there may be cases, such as where the business was split organisationally and was *J.B.L. 681
controlled via several sets of management,109 where the identification of a single controller or
co-ordinator is impossible and the only way to co-ordinate the process is by way of co-operation and
co-ordination between parallel proceedings (unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties).
Further developing COMI as an economic realities-based test which can enhance centralisation of
group proceedings would also help to solidify the concept (which is still looked at with some
suspicion).110 It would also make other international bodies more comfortable in continuing spreading
it and applying it to groups. Undoubtedly, for COMI (in particular in its application to groups) to work
well on the global level it is required that it would be widely embraced and recognised by nation
states. This eventuality may become more achievable if the concept is first firmly established within
the confines of European insolvency law.
All in all, the development of a centralised approach for international groups in insolvency fits with the
goals of cross-border insolvency and with the current trend in practice of facilitating smooth global
solutions for multinational groups. UNCITRAL appreciated this too, and thus its proposals on
co-operation and communication (discussed above) can be perceived as a sufficient minimum rather
than the final word on this topic. Europe can now take the matter one step forward--adopting means
of co-operation and communication between group members, as well as further enhancing
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centralised solutions.
Conclusion
Global lawmakers are catching up with economic realities. The enterprise group is no longer the “long
lost son” and international bodies dealing with insolvency attempt to address the issue
comprehensively, recognising the significance of this phenomenon. Specifically, UNCITRAL has
made a breakthrough in suggesting almost for the first time explicit internationally standardised
solutions for groups. Europe is now in the process of addressing the matter too, where it seems to
take into account the experience and suggestions of UNCITRAL as well. Looking outwards to this
global initiative with a view of complying with the new international standards will enhance
“cross-model” harmonisation and uniformity across regimes within and outside Europe. At the same
time, Europe can further lead the way in suggesting improved concepts which can allow greater
efficiency and the ability to devise smooth and harmonised solutions for groups--building on its rather
comprehensive framework for cross-border insolvency and the accumulative experience of Member
States' courts. The result could then be a “race to the top” where best practice comprehensive
solutions may ultimately be implemented worldwide.
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